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This blog is intended to be a governance resource and source of current governance commentary, offered by a corporate governance academic engaged in research, teaching and other ongoing academic activities. There is a very public element to the governance field, and it is hoped that this blog will contribute to the public discussion of current governance issues. It is also hoped that it will address a need in the governance field by presenting a holistic online approach to the topic. There is a rapid rate of change in the field of governance (public, private, government and not-for-profit entities) and developments in internet technology move swiftly. This governance gateway offers resources for a broad variety of stakeholders including: [...more]




The Mayor of Toronto’s entrenchment needs to end

Mayor Rob Ford’s stubborn refusal to address substantively the allegations of drug use, and the reputational contagion and distraction it has caused, needs to be addressed in short order.

Councillors should take all reasonable steps to procure Mr. Ford’s addressing of the issue, and if not, escalate as appropriate, including initiating removal from office if Mr. Ford does not answer the allegations, so the City’s business can continue. Mr. Ford’s brother, Councillor Doug Ford, is in a conflict of interest and should recuse himself from any process.

In a corporate setting, a Chief Executive engaging in similar patterns of behavior would not be tolerated by any board of directors. The CEO would have been fired long ago.

There are two issues here. One is behavour. The second is the ability to operate. The behavior – ranging from alleged conflicts of interest, boozing, womanizing, and now crack cocaine use, means that the Mayor’s political influence has become toxic. His ability to reach across the aisle, procure concessions, exert influence, and come to deals – so critical in the political process, has effectively ended. Operators and CEOs in the private sector would likely exercise an abundance of caution in discussions and City investment for reputational reasons and the inability of the Mayor to broker consensus.

Any CEO who had similar patterns would be unable to lead and operate as well.

Corporations now take extremely seriously reputation risk and the corporate brand. All executives, and indeed any employee, are representative of that brand now, with social media. There are internal controls over integrity, codes of conduct, social media response teams, and crisis planning that were not present even a few years ago.

The notion that a CEO could not respond in a business setting simply would not happen. Toronto City Council needs to hold their chief executive accountable, so the more important issues before the City can be addressed.

J.P. Morgan post-game analysis

I was interviewed by BNN where I said that what proponents for the split of CEO and Chair at JP Morgan had going against them this week was that the stock was up 50% and that the split would occur to an incumbent CEO, Jamie Dimon, as opposed to a new CEO, where the decision to split the roles by a board is easier.

Shareholders have spoken and the vote was almost a third in favor of having a separate Chair and CEO. However the risk committee directors received less than 60% support for their continued tenure on the board.

What are we to take from this, from a governance and accountability perspective?

First, the directors who received less than 60% should all be replaced. New directors should demonstrably possess solid risk and banking expertise – including a full understanding of complex derivatives – to sit on a board of this type. Management, including the Chairman, should have no say whatsoever as to who these directors are. Indeed the incumbent board should look to shareholders for suggestions.

Second, there is not a single new argument in the lead up to the chair-CEO vote that was not already mentioned in the Canadian context when Canadian banks ten years ago had combined roles, but now have separate chairs. I remember many bank chair-CEOs making impassioned arguments as to why they should keep the chair role, with the “support” of their boards. Shareholders and regulators eventually won this battle.

Share price or a threat to leave by Mr. Dimon is likely what swayed shareholders away from voting more fully for the split.

These are both troubling from a governance perspective. Directors should be free and empowered to take decisions that are best for the company and shareholders in the long term – decisions that may even result in short term share price decline. Share price also reflects multiple inputs, and it’s not certain that splitting the roles for governance purposes would affect share price irreparably.

Second, and more important, a CEO who threatens to leave is a red flag – or should be – for any board. It may signal lack of internal succession planning. No one is irreplaceable and the “leaving” card should be called by more boards – even in pay negotiations – through proper succession planning, that is to say internally ready candidates at all times.

Lastly, the decision of a separate chair vs. a lead director is vulnerable to the narrative that “it depends.” This is impenetrable and can reflect more ego, hubris and board capture. At some point, the decision on chair vs. lead director should be an objective standard, not subjective one. It is the same with standards for director independence.

There is a fundamental difference between a chair role and a lead director role. The chair role is stronger. Regulators should be more prescriptive and say the roles should be split as a matter of good governance and preventing a concentration of power absent accountability. They have done so in Canada and we have fared very well.

How do boards prepare for terrorism?

In a board meeting, the military general asked the airline’s CEO, “Why is the pilot’s food being labeled?” “Because that’s the way we always do it,” the CEO responded. “Well then stop doing it,” the military director said. “If I’m a terrorist, I might have trouble getting through the cockpit door, but you’re putting a red flag for me on how to poison the pilot and take down the plane.”

In that exchange, the new military director on the airline’s board of directors I was advising proved his value.

I am currently advising another board whose company is a target for a terrorist attack. Many other companies in transportation, utilities, defense, property development and financial services could take a page from below.

Here are six areas for boards to focus on to prepare for a possible terrorist attack.

1. Military experience on the Board. Military leaders have logistics, supply chain, tactical and international theatre experience civilian directors lack. Their contacts include the intelligence community. They think differently and understand evil.

2. Intelligence gathering. Boards should commission multi-lingual analytics from terrorist websites and chat-rooms, where the company, industry or executive is mentioned. There should be governmental relations on the board’s competency matrix. Boards want to know about unknown unknowns, or emerging risks that can be catastrophic (the black swan), or interdependent risks that rapidly interact. Risk registers don’t capture this dynamism yet. Proper intelligence gives boards and management teams a heads up.

3. Scenario planning. Good boards in sensitive industries are insisting on disaster recovery, catastrophic event planning, mock dry runs, and schedules so if or when it happens, the company is ready. There is even off-site functioning if the office is blown up.

4. CEO compensation. In a disaster that happened involving property destruction and death (another board), I was called in to recut the CEO’s compensation. It went from financial short-term to include risk, relations, internal controls, and crisis management metrics. The compensation committee has enormous often unused control over behaviours and you reward what you pay for.

5. Communication. The CEO should have media training to prepare for scenarios, and respond to journalist questions. When the event happens, it is too late if you don’t have this. Opinion crystallizes in days if not hours. The CEO profile for succession planning should include communication, intelligence gathering, and political linkages.

6. Invest in enterprise risk management (ERM) and information technology (IT). Risk management is often immature, cyber threats are significant, and good ERM is bottom up to include focus groups and integrated real-time IT. There are vulnerabilities that are missed without good ERM. Without being explicit, there are vulnerabilities at universities, cities, shopping malls and events that will surface in good ERM.

The bombers in Boston capitalized on police that were not there, inadequate crowd control at the finish line, and unattended unchecked bags. New York is much better at this now. Cameras, K-9 dogs, screening, monitoring, crowd control and escorts are all about choices. Management can choose not to do something. Boards can DIRECT that they do. This deters potential targets.

Canada has its first Say on Pay Failure: Barrick Gold

This 85% of votes cast against executive compensation could have been predicted. A $17M pay package, including a $11.9M signing bonus, was awarded to Barrick senior executive John Thornton, in advance of performance, in spite of a 20-year low in Barrick’s share price. Institutional shareholders gave a strong condemnation of this payment and the director votes soon followed in Barrick Gold’s annual shareholder meeting yesterday:

Compensation Committee Chair, J. Brett Harvey: 28% withhold;

Compensation Committee Member, Gustavo Cisneros: 27% withhold;

Compensation Committee Member, Steven J. Shapiro: 28% withhold;

Director Hon. Brian Mulroney (non-independent: received $2.5M as an advisor): 24% withhold;

Chairman Peter Munk (non-independent: controlling shareholder and part of management): 17.5% withhold;

Director Anthony Munk (non-independent: familial relationship): 24% withhold.

Barrick CEO Jamie Sokalsky said the board would “carefully consider” shareholder perspectives. Founder and Chairman Peter Munk deadpanned, “Bad times bring out more people.”

I spoke out against the quantum of the above pay package for Mr. Thornton, but there are two sides to every argument. Let me make the case for Barrick Gold and what it should have done from a governance perspective.

Chairman Peter Munk said “we had to secure him” [John Thornton] “because of the competitive environment.” Munk went on to say “It is hard to have someone paid on performance if he would not have been able to join to perform.”

There is merit to Peter Munk’s position. If shareholders truly believe in pay for performance, then it is equally important to attract and motivate executive talent in a downturn as it is in an upturn. This means, paradoxically, that a compensation committee will pay out more, in spite of low stock price, and rein in executive pay during an upturn. Mr. Thornton is motivated, as his shares have declined in price.

This pay philosophy is at odds with the more common approach to pay, which is “profit sharing.” This means executives are paid higher in peaks and lower in valleys, to “share the profit” with shareholders. Many pay metrics are aligned with shareholder returns. This could hamstring a company in attracting talent when it needs it most and paying talent during a bull market, where executives get unjustly enriched.

It is quite possible Mr. Thornton had to leave unvested equity on the table somewhere else and needed to be made whole. This is the rationale for a “golden handshake” and is completely reasonable.

It is important that Barrick explain the need at this time for this executive, with these qualities, to large shareholders and receive their support. A plan for asset sales and addressing Barrick’s problematic Pascua-Lama mine, and Mr. Thornton’s role, could have been laid out better. There is a rational argument for the payment that could have been better communicated by Barrick in advance of the vote. Other corporate boards are meeting directly with institutional shareholders in advance of meetings, to explain pay and make necessary changes.

What else could or should Barrick have done, from a governance perspective?

The board is in dire need of renewal. There are directors who have served on the board for 20 and almost 30 years (Messrs. Mulroney, Beck and Birchall). Some regulators are moving to caps of 9 years on directorships. There is also no indication of outside responsibilities of directors, on Barrick’s website. There is evidence that over-boarded directors lack oversight effectiveness. Governance disclosure is rather opaque, including which directors are independent and on what basis.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Mr. Munk owns less than 1% of the total equity of Barrick, yet controls the board appointments. The best governance reform would be for minority voting shareholders to have the right to nominate directors of their choosing. Canada has a large number of similar control-block companies, with dual share structures, whereby a dominant shareholder who may own a minority of total equity, has a majority of voting power. A good reform would be to have a “say on directors” that is commensurate and fair. Minority shareholders should have a say on directors.

American Banks Should Split the Chair and CEO Roles

Jamie Dimon and Lloyd Blankfein (Chairs and CEOs of J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs, respectively) should be relieved of their Board Chair responsibilities.

Here is why.

Consider how two hypothetical – but typical – board meetings play out: the first with a Chair and CEO role combined in one person, with another director as a “Lead Director,” and another board meeting with Chair and CEO roles separated into two people.

In the first board meeting, when one person occupies both the Chair and CEO roles, there is a very high concentration of power. Another director independent of management acts as a “lead” director as a counterpoint. The Lead Director may sit next to the Chair and CEO in the boardroom, but the Lead Director does not chair the actual board meeting. Nor do lead directors have final say when push comes to shove over the board agenda. They also don’t control the information flow the board receives, as good chairs do.

The Lead Director has influence, but the Board Chair has actual authority. What gets discussed, when and how, is the purview of the chairperson of any board. The most important role a Board Chair has is to control the discussion and how decisions get made (or not). If the person controlling the discussion, the information and the agenda (chair) has a vested interest in the outcome (CEO), there is an inherent bias in all decisions. The board’s fundamental oversight role to control management is compromised.

When I observe second types of board meetings with non-executive, independent Chairs and separate CEOs (i.e., two separate people), the dynamics are very different. The board meeting is almost “bi-polar” in nature. There is a natural counterpoint when debate happens because the CEO is separated out of the critical proposal and approval parts of the discourse. Power is more flat. Directors feel free to speak up because the chair is one of them (independent). It is hardly surprising to see the lead director role marginalized by a strong personality who controls a board meeting. CEOs have very strong personalities. Directors are more likely to weigh in and exercise independence if they aren’t blocked by their chair.

At one point, Canadian bank boards argued – unsuccessfully – and of course their CEO and Chair incumbents were the primary proponents, that good governance could include the fundamental conflict of a combined Chair and CEO role. “Good” governance, the argument goes, could include having exclusively independent committees, an effective lead director, and an effective reporting and assurance structure. Proponents for maintaining the Chair and CEO roles also argued whether to split of not “depends on the personalities,” somehow implying an effective chair who has a good working relationship with a CEO cannot be found. The real resistance to splitting the roles were the egos and hubris of the incumbents, and a captured board beholden to them at the time.

Shareholders and regulators prevailed in Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, where non-executive chairs are the norm. In the most recent set of governance reforms of 2013, for example, Canada’s financial institution regulator stated that the role of the Chair should be separate from the CEO, as this separation “is critical in maintaining the Board’s independence, as well as its ability to execute its mandate effectively.” Back in 2003, OSFI (Canada’s financial institution regulator) stated that both a non-executive chair versus a lead director could achieve board independence. The choice was up to the board, OSFI stated. Regulators have since progressed, advising that the roles can and should be split, for all federally regulated financial institutions, for the sake of good governance.

The fact of the matter is that having a non-executive chair separated from the CEO roles won’t guarantee success or prevent failure. Academics cannot prove a systemic relationship between board leadership and performance because chair effectiveness is so difficult to measure. But if the chair is effective, there is a much greater likelihood of better governance than relying on the effectiveness of a lead director. I have yet to see an effective lead director who approaches how effective a separate chair can be. A lead director role is institutionally more passive. Ask yourself if Jamie Dimon had to answer to a no-nonsense Chair who understood banking and risk whether the J.P. Morgan Chase’s risk meltdown would have occurred. (See the Senate report here.) The roles of a Lead Director and Board Chair are different. More and more American corporations are moving towards effective, non-executive chairs. Banks should not be dragging their feet.

The demise of the “blue chip” director

These are disguised but true stories.

A director who has never operated a plant or worked in the company’s industry chairs the board’s health and safety committee. Internal controls are missed and poison in the company’s products kills several customers.

A director from the food industry chairs the bank’s risk committee. The director does not understand complex derivatives. The bank loses hundreds of millions of dollars in risky trades. (This happened twice, in two different banks. In the second bank, which lost billions, the risk committee chair was from a museum that received donations from the bank.)

Many directors on this third board have no experience in the company’s industry or in the complex overseas markets in which the company operates. The company has alleged widespread bribery, for which the industry is notorious. The CEO is arrested and the company’s brand is splashed all over the news.

This director chairs a company’s strategy committee but has never worked in the industry. The company loses 75% of its stock value. It takes the company years to finally bring industry experts on to the board, but it may be too little too late.

Many directors on this board have never worked in the industry and do not understand financial reporting necessary to sit on this board. They do not recognize potential fraud and inappropriately incent management. The company goes from an iconic Canadian brand to almost nothing. Shareholders lose billions.

In Canada, prior to the arrival of a shareholder activist compelling necessary board change, this board did not even have a single director (other than the CEO) with experience in the very industry in which the company operates. The stock is now up 30%.

There are several other examples. In all of the above, the boards supposedly looked “great.” They were composed of high-profile, so called “blue chip” directors – former politicians, ambassadors, company CEOs, presidents, consultants, lawyers, academics and so on, yet there were all abject failures.

In Canada, as in several other countries, you do not have to understand the business to sit on the board. Shockingly, in Canada, a director does not even have to be financially literate (at least initially) to sit on the audit committee of a public company. Yet we expect these directors as fiduciaries to oversee shareholder investments and the company’s best interests. The requirements for being a public company director are astonishingly minimal.

The vast majority of directors are selected on the basis of formal independence, yet the academic evidence runs counter to this. I recommended to the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions in a study I was asked to do, that boards of financial institutions should have directors with industry and risk expertise. This is now the law in Canada – but it took until 2013. The SEC in 2009 (post financial crisis) enacted a law, citing my work, that directors had to be selected on the basis of qualifications, skills and competencies.

One reason activist directors are frustrated, they tell me, is the astonishing lack of experience directors have, from the industry that is necessary for the company’s strategy, and with solid track records of value creation. They, and the media, are now scrutinizing the background and expertise of directors. This is a welcome development. There needs to be a fundamental change in the way directors are selected, and the ability of shareholders to remove directors who do not have the background or experience.

The three most important attributes for a director are knowledge of the business, financial acumen and backbone. Most directors are not selected on this basis. If you do not have this, directors sit in meetings without any ability whatsoever to contribute meaningfully. Most of the time, they are silent, pretending to understand. They are out of their depth and taking up a valuable spot.

Contrast this with directors who are selected properly, not on profile, pedigree or prestige, but on mindset, experience and strategic track record. These directors are a pleasure to see. Management has to bring their “A” game for these directors. These directors ask question after question after question, weighing in with their enormous experience (often much more than management) and telling management what to think of, what the flaws are in their thinking, and how to perform better and recognize opportunity to add value. These directors hold management accountable and have the heft to do so. They know what questions to ask and when to act. They have “been there, done that.” When necessary, they tell the CEO which way to part his or her hair. There is no ambiguity in these boardrooms who is in charge. Management is accountable to the board and the board to shareholders.

Sadly, these latter directors and boards are in the minority.

Does Your Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee Need A Reset?

I am currently interviewing shareholder activists, hedge funds and private equity leaders on changes to public company boards to make them more focused on value creation and company performance. I am also interviewing leading directors and CEOs. My research reveals a disconnect between how many boards operate and how shareholder advocates believe they should operate.

For a board to operate effectively, it starts with an independent and effective Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee, which are the leadership and inner workings of a Board. It is here where governance accountability is established and good directors are selected, or not.

The focus since Sarbanes Oxley has been on the Audit Committee, and since Dodd-Frank on the Compensation Committee. But without an effective Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee, management accountability to the board, and board accountability to shareholders will be undermined.

If you want to make your Board more focused on company performance and value creation, ask yourself whether your Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee can answer “yes” to most of these questions, based on my interviews, in no particular order:

  1. Has the Board set standards for a vigorous value creation process, and does its value maximization plan clearly and simply spell out key timelines, milestones, targets, and individuals accountable for each key plan component and specific results? (Is the Board’s plan as good as or better that what an activist shareholder can provide? It should be.)
  2. Does each Director have the background into the company, the business model, the industry and markets to fully understand the value drivers and associated risks? (If not, does the Chair and Board have the backbone to replace those directors?)
  3.  Leadership goes well beyond whether the Chair is independent or not. Does the Board Chair possess the following attributes: Shareholder mindset, leadership, understanding of the value creation process and the capital markets, ability to view things holistically, an ethic of accepting personal responsibility, industry experience, and no desire for CEO role? (If not, is the Governance and Nominating Committee strong enough to recommend to the Board to replace the Chair?)
  4. Do the Board and Board Chair have the will to hold management to account for results and the courage to act decisively when needed?
  5. Does the Board ensure direct links to performance and value creation and the need to hit certain targets before any executive incentive compensation kicks in?
  6. Does each Director have a meaningful portion of his or her own savings invested in the company?
  7. Has the Governance and Nominating Committee recommended to the Board adopting shareholder accountability practices and removing entrenchment devices and other restrictions?
  8. If or when needed, does the Board and each Board Committee utilize resources and advisors independent of management who represent the interests of shareholders?
  9. Does the Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee look to shareholders for prospective directors, rather than to management?
  10. Does the Governance and Nominating Committee ensure that all governance terms of reference been redesigned to reflect the Board’s focus on value creation and company performance? (Many times these terms of reference written by management keep the board at bay.)
  11. Does the Board Chair and other Directors engage regularly and directly with key shareholders, without the presence of management? (The vast majority of boards do not meet with shareholders.)
  12. At these Director-Shareholder meetings, are the following matters covered off: Value creation and company performance; status of governance initiatives; board and committee composition and renewal; risk governance; and the governance of executive compensation?

If you answered yes to all questions, or even almost all, you likely have a truly outstanding Board Chair and Governance and Nominating Committee. You may even wish to apply for a governance award, here.

If you cannot answer yes to the majority of these questions, you have work to do.

Join me in my next blog where I will discuss “What makes for a high-performance Director?” based on about 30 interviews with shareholder advocates, search firms and members of the NACD 100 and Top 100 CEO listings.

Does Your Compensation Committee Need A Reset?

Executive pay practices are in the news on a regular basis. Just in the past few weeks, after meeting with investors, the performance metrics for Citigroup were changed following a failed say on pay vote a year ago. Yesterday, it was reported that Apple has required executives to hold triple their salary in stock.

The heat is now on Compensation Committees – who approve and set executive pay – more than ever before. Academic institutions are also keeping up, training our next generation of executives and directors on the rapidly changing terrain of best compensation governance practices and shareholder accountability. See the new course I developed for York University in this area, here.

What are the top pay practices for Compensation Committees? There are fifteen, listed below.

But before you read, ask yourself if you are a Compensation Committee member (or even a Board member not on the Committee), how many questions you can answer “yes” to.

If you are an investor, who will have a say on pay this upcoming proxy season, ask yourself if Compensation Committees at your investee companies conform to the practices below. The more questions that can be answered “yes,” the greater the likelihood there will be pay for performance that is directly aligned with value creation for you as a shareholder.

  1. Does each Compensation Committee member fully understand the company’s business model, the key value drivers, and the performance metrics arising from achieving the company’s strategy?
  2. Does the Compensation Committee precisely calibrate these metrics such that there is a direct line of sight and sufficient stretch for short-term bonuses and long-term performance-based equity?
  3. Has the Committee or an expert third party independent of management benchmarked your Compensation Committee Charter to best practices?
  4. Have you approved, and can you defend, the compensation of oversight functions (e.g., internal audit, risk, compliance) and key risk-takers within the organization? (Assume compliance failure occurs and these pay practices receive expert scrutiny.)
  5. Would a third party, after diligent checks into Compensation Committee member backgrounds and relationships to management, reasonably conclude that all Committee members are fully independent? (There are several red flags that may not be captured by formal independence standards – e.g., interlocks, reciprocity and social relatedness.)
  6. Do you have one female non-CEO on your Compensation Committee? Do you disclose the competencies and skills for each Compensation Committee member on your website?
  7. If you use a Compensation Consultant to assure compensation, has the entire firm or the person never done work for management before, and would otherwise be objectively viewed as fully independent?
  8. If you retain a lawyer to advise, negotiate or draft compensation agreements or pay plans under the Committee’s direction, has that lawyer never done work for the management before, and would otherwise be objectively viewed as fully independent?
  9. Do you have bonus deferral and equity vesting and hold requirements that are performance-based and risk-adjusted by the Committee?
  10. Would your compensation disclosure satisfy an investor as being fully transparent, understandable, clear, and absent of obfuscation or gaming? Do all Committee members fully review the disclosure, or have an independent advisor do so under the Committee’s direction?
  11. Whenever CEO compensation is discussed, the CEO leaves the room.
  12. Does each Committee member issue a cheque from their own savings to satisfy stock ownership requirements? (In other words, the stock is not given in lieu of board service, but they must pay for it.)
  13. Does your Compensation Committee meet directly with key investors to hear their views, without Management in the room?
  14. Does every Compensation Committee member have tenure on the board not exceeding nine years?
  15. Are key contractual provisions, such as a “clawback” or “malus,” and pay practices drafted by the Committee or an advisor independent of management who reports to the Committee, incorporating best practices?

If you answered yes to all questions, or even almost all, you likely have a truly outstanding Compensation Committee and pay for performance. You may even wish to apply for a governance award, here.

If you cannot answer yes to the majority of these questions, you have work to do.

Join me in my next blog where I will ask if your Nominating and Governance Committee needs a reset.

Does your Audit Committee Need a Reset?

I was recently asked to speak to audit committee members in Niagara-on-the-Lake on best practices for audit committees. See my slides here. I was particularly critical of how audit committees and boards oversee risk. Risk systems in many companies are immature. Look at BP, Wal-Mart, JP Morgan, HSBC, News of the World, Barclays, SNC Lavalin and MF Global. These are all risk management failures, which are turn are governance failures.

There is good reason for risk management failure.

Proper risk management requires internal controls to mitigate risk. (Internal controls are processes and procedures such as segregation of duties, documentation, authorization, supervision, physical safeguards, IT security and prevention of management override.) No one likes to be controlled. Risk management is not intrinsically profit-making. Therefore there is an inherent aversion to risk management by management.

This is why regulators now are targeting boards with greater risk governance obligations because only the board has the authority to control management. Recent bank governance guidelines in Canada require much stronger risk oversight by boards and audit committees. Recent Ontario Securities Commission guidelines offer advice to boards and audit committees with operations in emerging markets, coming out of the Sino-Forest debacle.

There is a strong bias for audit committees to oversee many risks, not just financial. No regulation mandates this however. Audit committees should not oversee risks that they are not qualified to oversee.

Here are a dozen broader questions to determine whether your Audit Committee needs a reset.

1. Do your board and board committees have coordinated coverage, assurance and reporting over all material enterprise risks, both financial and non-financial?

2. For any non-financial risks that your Audit Committee may oversee, do the skills and experiences on the committee match the oversight?

3. Has the Audit Committee proposed a written risk appetite framework, approved by the board, which translates into explicit limitations and thresholds throughout the organization?

4. Are there any acute risks that you do not understand, or over which management is capable of overriding existing controls?

5. Do all Audit Committee members have tenure on the board for fewer than nine years? (Exceeding nine years is a red flag for lack of independence.)

6. Does independent external audit firm have tenure for fewer than nine years? (This is also a red flag for lack of independence.)

7. If your company operates in an emerging market, do you have one Audit Committee member with direct experience operating in this market?

8. If your company has over 300 employees and it is a financial institution, or over 600 employees for any other type of company, do you have an effective internal audit function reporting directly to the Audit Committee?

9. Has your Audit Committee benchmarked the company’s risk management and internal control framework against best practices, using an independent external advisor?

10. Do you have an effective risk function that reports directly to the Audit Committee or board of directors?

11. Does your Audit Committee understand fraud implications of accounting policies, methods for making estimates, and compensation metrics?

12. At each Audit Committee meeting, do you meet separately with each of: the CFO; the internal audit function; the risk function; and the independent external auditor, without any member of management present?

When I asked for a show of hands during my lecture, not a lot of hands went up for many of the above types of questions.

If you answered yes to all questions, or even almost all, you likely have a truly outstanding audit committee. You may even wish to apply for a governance award, here.

If you cannot answer yes to the majority of these questions, you have work to do.

Join me in my next blog where I will ask if your Compensation Committee needs a reset.

Best practices in corporate governance, gender diversity and shareholder activism

I am giving a talk this week as part of a panel discussion on the above topic. Here is the advert if people are intersted, and here are my slides.


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